Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense BMD Program

Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense  BMD  Program

The Aegis BMD program gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY 2010 to 38 at the end of FY 2015. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles; Aegis BMD Flight Tests; Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program; (3) Issues for Congress: Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships; Demands for Aegis Ships in General; Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors; SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Defense against nuclear attack—so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal—has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question.

History of Strategic and Ballistic Missile Defense Volume I

The first question concerns the means that leaders chose for defense against an increasingly sophisticated offensive threat. Includes several appendices of chronologies, tables, charts, maps and notes.

History of Strategic and Ballistic Missile Defense  Volume I

As part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition which developed after World War II between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this study of the two countries¿ strategies for air and ballistic missile defense addresses two broad subjects: (1) How did each country approach the problem of defense against the threat from the air? (2) Why did each country accent particular elements of an air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972? The first question concerns the means that leaders chose for defense against an increasingly sophisticated offensive threat. Includes several appendices of chronologies, tables, charts, maps and notes.

Sea Based Ballistic Missile Defense

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication.

Sea Based Ballistic Missile Defense

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The proposed FY 2010 defense budget requests $1,859.5 million for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. The issue for Congress discussed in this report is: What should be the role of sea-based systems in U.S. ballistic missile defense, and are DoD¿s programs for sea-based BMD capabilities appropriately structured and funded? Potential issues for Congress re: sea-based BMD systems include the number of SM-3 interceptors planned for procurement, whether development of a far-term sea-based terminal defense BMD capability should be accelerated, technical risk in the Aegis BMD program, the number of Aegis BMD ships, and the role of Aegis BMD in European missile defense. Illustrations.

Ballistic Missile Defense

This book provides an overview of select issues and policies of the ballistic missile defence program.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defences. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabilities could be significant sources of military advantage during a conflict. But they may be equally significant in times of relative peace, when they undergird efforts to coerce states near and far. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range missiles that will be threatening to the United States. There is some uncertainty about when and how this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats. They are clear and present. The threat from short- range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a particularly rapid pace. This book provides an overview of select issues and policies of the ballistic missile defence program.

History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense

These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked?

History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense

From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat?

Long Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe

This report discusses how successive U.S. governments have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states.

Long Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe


Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense

Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on ...

Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense

The Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives set forth to provide an assessment of the feasibility, practicality, and affordability of U.S. boost-phase missile defense compared with that of the U.S. non-boost missile defense when countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. To provide a context for this analysis of present and proposed U.S. boost-phase and non-boost missile defense concepts and systems, the committee considered the following to be the missions for ballistic missile defense (BMD): protecting of the U.S. homeland against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or conventional ballistic missile attacks; protection of U.S. forces, including military bases, logistics, command and control facilities, and deployed forces, including military bases, logistics, and command and control facilities. They also considered deployed forces themselves in theaters of operation against ballistic missile attacks armed with WMD or conventional munitions, and protection of U.S. allies, partners, and host nations against ballistic-missile-delivered WMD and conventional weapons. Consistent with U.S. policy and the congressional tasking, the committee conducted its analysis on the basis that it is not a mission of U.S. BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on space agreements not adversely impact missile defense effectiveness. This report also explains in further detail the findings of the committee, makes recommendations, and sets guidelines for the future of ballistic missile defense research.

Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions

Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) have been an issue in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control talks since the 1970s.

Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions

Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) have been an issue in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control talks since the 1970s. During the Cold War, the nations sought to balance limits on offensive weapons and defensive weapons so that they could maintain ¿strategic stability,¿ which refers to the ability of each side to launch a retaliatory strike after absorbing a first strike by the other side. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Strategic Stability and the Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Forces; (3) BMD and the 1991 START Treaty: The Negotiating Framework; START Ratification; Resolving Competing Priorities; BMD Programs and Budgets; BMD in the 1980s, and 1990s; Current BMD Plans and Programs; (4) BMD Budgets Over Time.

Why ABM

The book first discusses early, present, and future missile defense systems, including the efficiency of missile defense and the use of missiles in penetration aids and tactics.

Why ABM

Why ABM?: Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy focuses on the problems of invention and deployment of defenses against anti-ballistic missiles (ABM). The book first discusses early, present, and future missile defense systems, including the efficiency of missile defense and the use of missiles in penetration aids and tactics. The deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) is explained. The text takes a look at the missile defense systems of the Soviet Union and their participation in the arms race. The reactions of the Soviet Union on the use of BMD and positions of Soviets and.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The Missile Defense Agency estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more than $4 billion through 2015.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The Missile Defense Agency estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe are intended to defend the U.S., its deployed forces, and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-to-be-determined European location. This report evaluates DoD¿s plans for missile defense sites in Europe and addresses to what extent DoD has: (1) planned for the sites' implementation; and (2) estimated military construction and long-term operations and support costs. Charts and tables.

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

Highlights 50 of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) best success stories emerging from technology transfer in the past year.

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

Highlights 50 of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) best success stories emerging from technology transfer in the past year. Covers technologies such as: communications and displays, computer hardware and software, manufacturing, materials, medicine, optics, sensors, and dual-use technologies. Also discusses the program's integrated efforts to support BMDO-funded technologies at various stages of development through the following approaches: making industry aware of BMDO-funded innovations, guiding researchers in the commercialization process, leveraging coop. relationships; and testing innovative models to commercialize BMDO-funded technology.

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

Naveh and Lorber pull together 40 years of experience in Israeli theater missile defense activities and provide in this single volume those special issues, state-of-the-design considerations, technologies, and procedures related to the ...

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

The biggest single increase in the U.S. defense budget request for modernization spending over the next six years is for ballistic missile defense, including theater and national systems. Engineers, managers, and policy makers will need to stay abreast of the ever-changing state of the art in theater ballistic missile defense. Very few books in the market cover the special technical and design issues involved in the development of a ballistic missile defense system. Drs. Naveh and Lorber pull together 40 years of experience in Israeli theater missile defense activities and provide in this single volume those special issues, state-of-the-design considerations, technologies, and procedures related to the theater ballistic missile defense arena.

Ballistic Missile Defense In The Post cold War Era

The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental ...

Ballistic Missile Defense In The Post cold War Era

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

The Soviet Union And Ballistic Missile Defense

After exploring the internal budgetary debates that will affect future Soviet decisions on BMD and space systems, the book outlines Soviet responses, political as well as military, to the Strategic Defense Initiative and concludes with ...

The Soviet Union And Ballistic Missile Defense

Originally published in 1987. In the debate over strategic defense, the Soviet dimension has not been adequately examined. Dr. Parrott's multifaceted discussion of the Soviet approach to ballistic missile defense (BMD) admirably fills that gap. Based on an analysis of Soviet statements and Soviet weaponry, the study surveys Soviet perceptions of the shifting relationship between the superpowers and the effect of BMD on that relationship. The author then traces the evolution of Soviet policies toward ballistic missile defense and the introduction of weapons into space. After exploring the internal budgetary debates that will affect future Soviet decisions on BMD and space systems, the book outlines Soviet responses, political as well as military, to the Strategic Defense Initiative and concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy toward BMD and arms negotiations.

Ballistic Missile Defense

This book provides an overview of select issues and policies of the ballistic missile defense program.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabi.

History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense 1956 1972

These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked?

History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense  1956 1972

From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat?

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance

Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from ...

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance

Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.

Ballistic Missile Defense

This report assesses the extent to which DoD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the MDA develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. Includes recommend. Illus.

Ballistic Missile Defense

In 2002, the DoD established the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DoD requirements and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile defenses to meet specific operational requirements. This report assesses the extent to which DoD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the MDA develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. Includes recommend. Illus.