Dien Bien Phu 1954

Here, author Martin Windrow describes how from their first assaults on 13 March 1954, the battle quickly developed into a dramatic 56-day 'Stalingrad in the jungle' that drew the attention of the world.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

In late 1953, the seventh year of France's war against the Viet Minh insurgency in its colony of Vietnam, the C-in-C, General Navarre, was encouraged to plant an 'air-ground base' in the Thai Highlands at Dien Bien Phu, to distract General Giap's Vietnamese People's Army from both Annam and the French northern heartland in the Red River Delta, and to protect the Laotian border. Elite French paratroopers captured Dien Bien Phu, which was reinforced between December 1953 and February 1954 with infantry and artillery, a squadron of tanks and one of fighter-bombers, to a strength of 10,000 men. Giap and the VPA General Staff accepted the challenge of a major positional battle; through a total mobilization of national resources, and with Chinese logistical help, they assembled a siege army of 58,000 regular troops, equipped for the first time with 105mm artillery and 37mm AA guns. Here, author Martin Windrow describes how from their first assaults on 13 March 1954, the battle quickly developed into a dramatic 56-day 'Stalingrad in the jungle' that drew the attention of the world.

The Road to Dien Bien Phu

The Road to Dien Bien Phu tells the story of how Ho Chi Minh turned a ragtag guerrilla army into a modern fighting force capable of bringing down the formidable French army.

The Road to Dien Bien Phu

A multifaceted history of Ho Chi Minh’s climactic victory over French colonial might that foreshadowed America’s experience in Vietnam On May 7, 1954, when the bullets stopped and the air stilled in Dien Bien Phu, there was no doubt that Vietnam could fight a mighty colonial power and win. After nearly a decade of struggle, a nation forged in the crucible of war had achieved a victory undreamed of by any other national liberation movement. The Road to Dien Bien Phu tells the story of how Ho Chi Minh turned a ragtag guerrilla army into a modern fighting force capable of bringing down the formidable French army. Taking readers from the outbreak of fighting in 1945 to the epic battle at Dien Bien Phu, Christopher Goscha shows how Ho transformed Vietnam from a decentralized guerrilla state based in the countryside to a single-party communist state shaped by a specific form of “War Communism.” Goscha discusses how the Vietnamese operated both states through economics, trade, policing, information gathering, and communications technology. He challenges the wisdom of counterinsurgency methods developed by the French and still used by the Americans today, and explains why the First Indochina War was arguably the most brutal war of decolonization in the twentieth century, killing a million Vietnamese, most of them civilians. Panoramic in scope, The Road to Dien Bien Phu transforms our understanding of this conflict and the one the United States would later enter, and sheds new light on communist warfare and statecraft in East Asia today.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

Describes the background, events, and aftermath of the fifty-five day battle at Dien Bien Phu, a village in North Vietnam, which claimed nearly ten thousand lives.

Dien Bien Phu  1954

Describes the background, events, and aftermath of the fifty-five day battle at Dien Bien Phu, a village in North Vietnam, which claimed nearly ten thousand lives.

Dien Bien Phu

Anthony Tucker-Jones guides the reader through this decisive conflict with a concise text and contemporary photographs, providing critical insight into the conduct of the war by both sides and its wider ramifications.The Viet Minh, after ...

Dien Bien Phu

When the world held its breath It is 25 years since the end of the Cold War, now a generation old. It began over 75 years ago, in 1944long before the last shots of the Second World War had echoed across the wastelands of Eastern Europewith the brutal Greek Civil War. The battle lines are no longer drawn, but they linger on, unwittingly or not, in conflict zones such as Iraq, Somalia and Ukraine. In an era of mass-produced AK-47s and ICBMs, one such flashpoint was French Indochina At the end of the Second World War France sought to reassert its military prestige, but instead suffered humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in French colonial Indochina. The First Indochina war became a textbook example of how not to conduct counterinsurgency warfare against nationalist guerrillas. Anthony Tucker-Jones guides the reader through this decisive conflict with a concise text and contemporary photographs, providing critical insight into the conduct of the war by both sides and its wider ramifications.The Viet Minh, after resisting the Japanese in Indochina, sought independence for Vietnam from France. The French, with limited military resources, moved swiftly to reassert control in 1945, sparking a decade-long conflict. French defense of Hanoi rested on holding the Red River Delta, making it a key battleground. When the Viet Minh invaded neighboring Laos the French deployed to fight a set-piece battle at Dien Bien Phu, in 1954, but instead were trapped. All relief attempts failed and French defenses were slowly overwhelmed. America considered coming to the garrisons rescue using nuclear weapons, but instead left it to its fate, which set the scene for the Algerian and the Vietnam conflicts.

Dien Bien Phu

Dien Bien Phu


Dien Bien Phu 1954

David Stone, a British Army officer of the post World War II era, leads the reader through the complex nature of this significant action.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

David Stone is a former British army infantry officer. Much of his service was in Germany, both with and alongside soldiers of the Bundeswehr in peacetime and on operations. He became a military historian in 2002, and is the author of the authoritative works Hitler s Army: The Men, Machines and Organisation, 1939 1945 (2009) and Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day (2006). Richard Holmes described the latter as the most comprehensive and accessible account of the German soldier ever published in English. His other titles include the acclaimed First Reich (2002), Battles in Focus: Dien Bien Phu (2004), Wars of the Cold War (2004) and War Summits (2005). He also wrote Cold War Warriors (1998) and was a consultant and co-author of World War II Chronicle (2007).

Dien Bien Phu 1954 TET Offensive 1968 and Clausewitz An Analysis

The result is a comparative analysis between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the TET Offensive of 1968 in South Vietnam. On the tactical level of war the two operations could not be more dissimilar.

Dien Bien Phu 1954  TET Offensive 1968  and Clausewitz  An Analysis

This paper presents an analysis of Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive of 1968 by the author, a student at the National War College. The analysis is in response to a request by President Lyndon B. Johnson to get some clarification on any linkage between Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive, and the role of Carl von Clausewitz's theories in explaining the two battles. The result is a comparative analysis between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the TET Offensive of 1968 in South Vietnam. On the tactical level of war the two operations could not be more dissimilar. The former was an outright tactical defeat of a French strong point by the Vietminh, while the latter was a defeat of a large number of South Vietnamese Communists by U.S. Forces. However, it is on the strategic level of war, in support of strategic national policy formulation and execution, that the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and TET 68 merge.

The Battle of Dienbienphu

Full account of the French disaster in Vietnam in 1954, brought about by a peasant army of communist Viet Cong guerrilas. Based on interviews with participants on both sides.

The Battle of Dienbienphu

Full account of the French disaster in Vietnam in 1954, brought about by a peasant army of communist Viet Cong guerrilas. Based on interviews with participants on both sides.

Decision Against War

Decision Against War


Dien Bien Phu

Between November 1953 and May 1954, Dien Bien Phu was the scene of fierce struggles between Vietnamese fighters and the colonial French forces.

Dien Bien Phu

Between November 1953 and May 1954, Dien Bien Phu was the scene of fierce struggles between Vietnamese fighters and the colonial French forces. This conflict led to the French withdrawal from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and the author here leads readers through the action.

Dwight D Eisenhower Decision Not to Intervene at Dien Bien Phu 1954

Features correspondence by U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower (1890-1969) and a diary entry by U.S. White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty (b. 1909) regarding Eisenhower's decision not to intervene in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien ...

Dwight D  Eisenhower  Decision Not to Intervene at Dien Bien Phu  1954

Features correspondence by U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower (1890-1969) and a diary entry by U.S. White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty (b. 1909) regarding Eisenhower's decision not to intervene in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu between the French colonial forces and the Vietnamese. Includes study questions.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

The French Defeat that Lured America into Vietnam Martin Windrow. DIEN BIEN PHU 1954 The French Defeat that Lured America into Vietnam MARTIN WINDROW ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS CAMPAIGN 366 DIEN BIEN PHU 1954 The French Defeat that.

Dien Bien Phu 1954

In late 1953, the seventh year of France's war against the Viet Minh insurgency in its colony of Vietnam, the C-in-C, General Navarre, was encouraged to plant an 'air-ground base' in the Thai Highlands at Dien Bien Phu, to distract General Giap's Vietnamese People's Army from both Annam and the French northern heartland in the Red River Delta, and to protect the Laotian border. Elite French paratroopers captured Dien Bien Phu, which was reinforced between December 1953 and February 1954 with infantry and artillery, a squadron of tanks and one of fighter-bombers, to a strength of 10,000 men. Giap and the VPA General Staff accepted the challenge of a major positional battle; through a total mobilization of national resources, and with Chinese logistical help, they assembled a siege army of 58,000 regular troops, equipped for the first time with 105mm artillery and 37mm AA guns. Here, author Martin Windrow describes how from their first assaults on 13 March 1954, the battle quickly developed into a dramatic 56-day 'Stalingrad in the jungle' that drew the attention of the world.

Dien Bien Phu

Describes the historical background, events, and aftermath of the 1954 battle at Dien Bien Phu, which led to the end of the first Indochina War.

Dien Bien Phu

Describes the historical background, events, and aftermath of the 1954 battle at Dien Bien Phu, which led to the end of the first Indochina War.

INDO 1945 1954 From Haiphong to Dien Bien Phu

Nowfel Leulliot and Danny O'Hara offer information about the Indochinese War (1946-1954).

INDO 1945 1954  From Haiphong to Dien Bien Phu

Nowfel Leulliot and Danny O'Hara offer information about the Indochinese War (1946-1954). The information includes a history of the war, as well as details about the French Far-East Expeditionary Corps, the Vietminh, and the campaigns of the war.

The Generalship of General Henri E Navarre During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

This study examines the generalship of the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, General Henri E. Navarre, during the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

The Generalship of General Henri E  Navarre During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was the climactic confrontation of the First Indochina War between French Union forces and committed Viet Minh revolutionaries. The battle occurred between March and May 1954 and ended in a disastrous French defeat that would influence negotiations over the future of Indochina. History has the defeat of the French forces at the battle of Dien Bien Phu due largely to the failure in the application of professional military skills by the Commander-in-Chief, General Henri E. Navarre. In this work, the author, a U.S. Army officer analyzes the actions of General Navarre, to determine if the judgment of history is supported.

Doctor At Dien Bien Phu

With the fall of the base on May 7, he was taken into captivity by the Viet Minh. Grauwin remained in captivity until June 1, when he and other French medical officers were exchanged for several hundred Vietnamese prisoners.

Doctor At Dien Bien Phu

Includes 34 illustrations. The searing firsthand account of the horrors suffered by the French paratroops and soldiers during the siege of Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the Viet Minh. During the course of the First Indochina War, the French had established a base at Dien Bien Phu in late 1953. Dr. Grauwin, holding the rank of major, arrived in February 1954 to take charge of the 42-bed hospital unit there, conducting triage for evacuation and operating when necessary. By the end of the battle in May, Grauwin had more than 1,300 wounded in the makeshift wards of his hospital, and deprived by the shelling of electricity, was forced to operate by candlelight. With the fall of the base on May 7, he was taken into captivity by the Viet Minh. Grauwin remained in captivity until June 1, when he and other French medical officers were exchanged for several hundred Vietnamese prisoners.

The Angel of Dien Bien Phu

A Presidential Medal of Freedom winner recounts her time as the only woman among some 11,000 French defenders at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, a time when, as a flight nurse for the French air force, she relentlessly and selflessly tended to ...

The Angel of Dien Bien Phu

A Presidential Medal of Freedom winner recounts her time as the only woman among some 11,000 French defenders at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, a time when, as a flight nurse for the French air force, she relentlessly and selflessly tended to countless wounded as the battle raged on.