Philosophy Psychology and Psychologism

This book presents a remarkable diversity of contemporary opinions on the prospects of addressing philosophical topics from a psychological perspective.

Philosophy  Psychology  and Psychologism

This book presents a remarkable diversity of contemporary opinions on the prospects of addressing philosophical topics from a psychological perspective. It considers the history and philosophical merits of psychologism, and looks systematically at psychologism in phenomenology, cognitive science, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophical semantics, and artificial intelligence.

Psychologism

Introducing forms of analysis new to the history of philosophy, psychologism will make fascinating reading for lecturers and students of philosophy, psychology, sociology and cognitive science; it will also stimulate renewed debate on the ...

Psychologism

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Overcoming Psychologism Husserl and the Transcendental Reform of Psychology

This book shows us how rather than abandoning psychology once he liberated phenomenology from the psychologism of the philosophy of arithmetic, Edmund Husserl remained concerned with the ways in which phenomenology held important ...

Overcoming Psychologism  Husserl and the Transcendental Reform of Psychology

This book shows us how rather than abandoning psychology once he liberated phenomenology from the psychologism of the philosophy of arithmetic, Edmund Husserl remained concerned with the ways in which phenomenology held important implications for a radical reform of psychology throughout his intellectual career. The author fleshes out what such a radical reform actually entails, and proposes that it can only be accomplished by following the trail of the transcendental reduction described in Husserl’s later works. In order to appreciate the need for the transcendental even for psychology, the book tracks Husserl’s thinking on the nature of this relationship between phenomenology as a philosophy and psychology as a positive science as it evolved over time. The text covers Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as “descriptive psychology” in the Logical Investigations, rejecting the hybrid form of “phenomenological psychology” described in the lectures by that name, and ends with his proposal for a “fundamental refashioning” of psychology by situating it within the transcendental framework of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The Author argues for a re-grounding of psychology by virtue of a “return to positivity” after having performed the reduction to transcendental intersubjectivity. What results is a phenomenological approach to a transcendentally-grounded psychology which, while having returned to the life-world, no longer remains transcendentally naïve. A phenomenologically-grounded psychology thus empowers researchers, clinicians, and clients alike to engage in social actions that move the world closer to achieving social justice for all. This text appeals to students and researchers working in phenomenology and psychology.

Rationality and Logic

In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical.

Rationality and Logic

An argument that logic is intrinsically psychological and human psychology is intrinsically logical, and that the connection between human rationality and logic is both constitutive and mutual. In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical. He claims that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals (including humans) and that rational animals are essentially logical animals. In order to do so, he defends the broadly Kantian thesis that all (and only) rational animals possess an innate cognitive "logic faculty." Hanna's claims challenge the conventional philosophical wisdom that sees logic as a fully formal or "topic-neutral" science irreconcilably separate from the species- or individual-specific focus of empirical psychology.Logic and psychology went their separate ways after attacks by Frege and Husserl on logical psychologism—the explanatory reduction of logic to empirical psychology. Hanna argues, however, that—despite the fact that logical psychologism is false—there is an essential link between logic and psychology. Rational human animals constitute the basic class of cognizers or thinkers studied by cognitive psychology; given the connection between rationality and logic that Hanna claims, it follows that the nature of logic is significantly revealed to us by cognitive psychology. Hanna's proposed "logical cognitivism" has two important consequences: the recognition by logically oriented philosophers that psychologists are their colleagues in the metadiscipline of cognitive science; and radical changes in cognitive science itself. Cognitive science, Hanna argues, is not at bottom a natural science; it is both an objective or truth-oriented science and a normative human science, as is logic itself.

G F Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy

This book is also of value for those interested in judgement, proposition, psychologism, logical realism, the problem of error, Gestalt theories, and tropes.

G F  Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy

An investigatation of the influence of psychology and early phenomenology on the origins of analytic philosophy. This book is also of value for those interested in judgement, proposition, psychologism, logical realism, the problem of error, Gestalt theories, and tropes.

The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge

it provided pure philosophers with a powerful argumentative weapon - both against each other and against experimental psychology - but also because no one accused of psychologism could afford to ignore the accusation.

The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge

This volume brings together a number of authors that see themselves as contribu tors to, or critical commentators on, a new field that has recently emerged within the sociology of knowledge. This new field is 'the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge' (SPK). Studying philosophers and their knowledge from broadly sociological or political perspectives is not, of course, a recent phenomenon. Marxist writers have used such perspectives throughout the twentieth century, and, since the sixties, feminist authors have also occasionally engaged in sociological analysis of philosophers' texts. What distinguishes SPK from these sociologies is that SPK is not engaged in a political struggle; indeed, SPK remains, in general, neutral with respect to the truth or falsity of the doctrines it studies. In doing so, SPK follows the 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In 'Wittgenstein as a Conservative Thinker', David Bloor draws on the work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim in order to situate Wittgenstein's philosophy. Mannheim distinguished between two important styles of thought in the nine teenth century. The first, the 'natural law' ideology was associated with ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It emphasized individualism, progress, and universal reason. The second style of thought was 'conservatism'.

G F Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy

nineteenthcentury philosophy are those philosophers with a positive interest in psychology, who at the same time distinguish clearly between logical ... The term 'psychologism'seems not to havebeen usedbefore1870, when the HegelianJ.

G F  Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy

An investigatation of the influence of psychology and early phenomenology on the origins of analytic philosophy. This book is also of value for those interested in judgement, proposition, psychologism, logical realism, the problem of error, Gestalt theories, and tropes.

Philosophy of Arithmetic

This volume is a window on a period of rich and illuminating philosophical activity that has been rendered generally inaccessible by the supposed "revolution" attributed to "Analytic Philosophy" so-called.

Philosophy of Arithmetic

This volume is a window on a period of rich and illuminating philosophical activity that has been rendered generally inaccessible by the supposed "revolution" attributed to "Analytic Philosophy" so-called. Careful exposition and critique is given to every serious alternative account of number and number relations available at the time.

The Crisis of Philosophy

involved in the psychological description of thought . The different versions of philosophical psychologism can be traced to competing theories of meaning , but they commonly assume that the analysis of meaning is essentially a ...

The Crisis of Philosophy

This book presents a sympathetic yet critical treatment of the major philosophical attempts to define a viable project for philosophy in the face of historical changes. McCarthy, then, proposes a comprehensive, critical, and methodological strategy of epistemic integration that fully respects the progressive and pluralistic character of contemporary science and common sense. The programs of Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Sellers, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty are carefully presented and an assessment is made of their merits and limitations. This assessment results in a defense of Lonergan's integrative strategy -- a nuanced philosophical strategy around which a gathering center could be built. McCarthy presents Lonergan's work as containing the firm outline and partial execution of a philosophical project continuous with philosophy's historic purposes and equal to the exigences of the present. The book examines a broad range of seminal topics and, after extended dialectical treatment of them, develops a coherent account of their interdependence. These topics include psychologism, intentionality, the limits of naturalism, semantical and epistemic realism, historical belonging, epistemic invariance, foundational analysis, the limitation of logic and of the linguistic turn, generalized empirical method, the interdependence of mind and language, the interplay of nature and history, and the critical appropriation of tradition.

The Foundation of Phenomenology

Farber makes clear his preference for phenomenology as a purely descriptive method and his opposition to have it serve as a last stronghold of metaphysics.Indispensable as groundwork for descriptive philosophical study, this book will ...

The Foundation of Phenomenology

In this widely hailed and long out of print classic of twentieth century philosophic commentary, Professor Farber explains the origin, development, and function of phenomenology with a view towards its significance for philosophy in general.The book offers a general account of Husserl and the background of his philosophy. The early chapters are devoted to his mathematical-philosophical and psychological studies. The refutation of psychologism is present in detail, together with the critical reaction to it. The development of his logical theories in the light of contemporary literature at the close of the 19th century is next considered. The main content of the six Logical Investigations follows, which contribute to the phenomenological elucidation of experience and knowledge. The phenomenological philosophy of logic as developed in Husserl's later writings is then introduced, followed by a discussion of the phenomenological method and its proper function. Farber makes clear his preference for phenomenology as a purely descriptive method and his opposition to have it serve as a last stronghold of metaphysics.Indispensable as groundwork for descriptive philosophical study, this book will deeply interest not only serious students of philosophy and psychology, but also those who are concerned with the philosophical aspects of mathematics, social and natural sciences, law and psychiatry.

A Guide to Kant s Psychologism

Having operated in a time and place steeped in psychological philosophy, Kant tended to focus his efforts on those aspects of psychologism where he had the most to contribute and left it to readers sharing this background to fill in the ...

A Guide to Kant   s Psychologism

This book presents an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant’s philosophy together with those of the British empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant’s psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant’s philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant’s philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.

Modern Philosophy

CHAPTER IV PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY § 1. PSYCHOLOGISM. IN the medley of psychology and physiology that Fechner and, following him, Wundt have baptized with the name of psycho-physics, we have a survival of the old naturalism.

Modern Philosophy

Originally published in 1921, this volume represents De Ruggiero's first appearance in English, being the first time his philosophical works were translated. Modern Philosophy presents a positive philosophical position of great interest, avowedly in continuation of Croce and in close agreement with Gentile, which sums up the progress of Italian idealism down to the writing of this book. It is a remarkable piece of historical work, focusing on the development of European philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, and was the first volume to comprehensively handle this time period.

Computational Philosophy of Science

Psychologism Thus computational philosophy of science is intimately tied with cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence . If the cognitive sciences suggest a revision of standard views of the structure and growth of knowledge ...

Computational Philosophy of Science

By applying research in artificial intelligence to problems in the philosophy of science, Paul Thagard develops an exciting new approach to the study of scientific reasoning. This approach uses computational ideas to shed light on how scientific theories are discovered, evaluated, and used in explanations. Thagard describes a detailed computational model of problem solving and discovery that provides a conceptually rich yet rigorous alternative to accounts of scientific knowledge based on formal logic, and he uses it to illuminate such topics as the nature of concepts, hypothesis formation, analogy, and theory justification.

Frege

Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. ——— “Introduction: Psychologism the Philosophical Shibboleth.

Frege

A rich and informative biography of one of the most important and influential figures of analytic philosophy.

Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov Warsaw School

PSYCHOLOGISM Twardowski's opinions on the role of psychology in philosophy evolved. Initially he thought that psychology is the foundation of philosophy and that psychologism is the only antithesis of metaphysicism.

Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov   Warsaw School

The Lvov-Warsaw School was active in all spheres of philosophy. Its members worked in the border area between philosophy and disci plines such as psychology, linguistics, and literary theory. But its most important achievements were without doubt in logic and philosophical analysis based on logic. The present book is concerned with fields to which the Lvov-Warsaw School made its most important and famous contributions. Data on the School as a whole are included only in the first and last part of the book. This work is based on my monograph (1985), which appeared in Polish. But it is not merely a translation, because some fragments of the Polish version have been omitted (e. g., the chapter on ethics), and some have been revised. Many persons helped me in my work on the book in Polish as well as on the present edition. I must first mention the late Izydora D~mbska, to whom this book is dedicated. On various detailed issues I have availed myself of advice and information given to me by Stefan Amsterdamski, Zdzislaw Augustynek, Kazimierz Czarnota, Henryk Hii, Boleslaw Iwanus, Jacek Jadacki, Jacek KabziIiski, Stanislaw Kiczuk, Tomasz Komendzinski, Janina Kotarbinska, Czeslaw Lejewski, Jerzy Perzanowski, Marian Przet~cki, the late Jerzy Slupecki, Klemens Szaniawski, Stefan Zamecki, Zbigniew Zwinogrodzki i Jan Zygmunt. I am indebted to Jaakko Hintikka for suggesting that my book be trans lated into English and published by Reidel. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz helped me to prepare the English text.

A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems

Philosophy, Psychology and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 2003. [Jacquette, 2003b Dale Jacquette. Psychologism revisited in logic, metaphysics and ...

A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems

The present work is a continuation of the authors' acclaimed multi-volume A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. After having investigated the notion of relevance in their previous volume, Gabbay and Woods now turn to abduction. In this highly original approach, abduction is construed as ignorance-preserving inference, in which conjecture plays a pivotal role. Abduction is a response to a cognitive target that cannot be hit on the basis of what the agent currently knows. The abducer selects a hypothesis which were it true would enable the reasoner to attain his target. He concludes from this fact that the hypothesis may be conjectured. In allowing conjecture to stand in for the knowledge he fails to have, the abducer reveals himself to be a satisficer, since an abductive solution is not a solution from knowledge. Key to the authors' analysis is the requirement that a conjectured proposition is not just what a reasoner might allow himself to assume, but a proposition he must defeasibly release as a premiss for further inferences in the domain of enquiry in which the original abduction problem has arisen. The coverage of the book is extensive, from the philosophy of science to computer science and AI, from diagnostics to the law, from historical explanation to linguistic interpretation. One of the volume's strongest contributions is its exploration of the abductive character of criminal trials, with special attention given to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Underlying their analysis of abductive reasoning is the authors' conception of practical agency. In this approach, practical agency is dominantly a matter of the comparative modesty of an agent's cognitive agendas, together with comparatively scant resources available for their advancement. Seen in these ways, abduction has a significantly practical character, precisely because it is a form of inference that satisfices rather than maximizes its response to the agent's cognitive target. The Reach of Abduction will be necessary reading for researchers, graduate students and senior undergraduates in logic, computer science, AI, belief dynamics, argumentation theory, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, linguistics, forensic science, legal reasoning and related areas. Key features: - Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems. - The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works. - Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preserving inference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational. - Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character of abduction. - The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticated conceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling. · Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems. · The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works · Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preserving inference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational. · Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character of abduction. · The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticated conceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling.

Aspects of Psychologism

'criteria' and 'grammar', which play the role of something like necessary or analytic connections in other philosophers; or as Cavell puts it, he wanted to 'show the necessity controlling our application of psychological and ...

Aspects of Psychologism

Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.

Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy

But, in point of fact, the logical psychologism rejected by Frege and Husserl is the doctrine that logic is fully explicable by means of empirical (or 'experimental'15) psychology: 'The basic error of Psychologism consists, according to ...

Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy

Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. Hanna's book therefore comprises both an interpretative study of Kant's massive and seminal Critique of Pure Reason, and a critical essay on the historical foundations of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. Hanna considers Kant's key doctrines in the Critique in the light of their reception and transmission by the leading figures of the analytic tradition—Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defence of Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth. These will make Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy compelling reading not just for specialists in the history of philosophy, but for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues.

Psychological Knowledge

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views.

Psychological Knowledge

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns. Psychological Knowledge is both an introduction to the workings of constructivism as well as an insightful exploration of the history of psychology and the recent developments in philosophy of the mind.