The Logic of Autonomy

Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning Jan-R Sieckmann. Volume 5 in the series Law and Practical Reason The intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of essays that address the fundamental issues in ...

The Logic of Autonomy

Autonomy is the central idea of modern practical philosophy. Understood as self-legislation, autonomy seems to require that the validity of norms depends on recognition, namely, that their addressees, being autonomous agents, recognise these norms to be valid. But how can one be bound by norms whose validity depends on their being recognised as valid by their addressees? The questions of how autonomous morality and, on this basis, the authoritative character of law can be understood, present persistent puzzles that have been widely discussed, but still await a satisfactory solution. This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality. It links the idea of autonomy with the idea of the balancing of normative arguments, develops a notion of normative arguments as distinct from normative judgements and statements and explains claims to correctness and objectivity that are found in normative discourse. Thus, a 'logic of autonomy' emerges, and it is pervasive in normative reasoning. It connects theses regarding the logic of norms, the structure of balancing, human and fundamental rights, legal validity, legal interpretation, and the relations among legal systems, offering a theory of central elements of normative argumentation, a theory that is undergirded by the mutual relations that exist between and among its parts as well as through the relations that it bears to other theories. Moreover, it offers an alternative to Kantian notions of autonomy and provides solutions to problems that other theories have failed to master.

Private Law and the Value of Choice

Law and Practical Reason The intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of ... 5: The Logic of Autonomy: Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning Jan-R Sieckmann Volume 6: Law and Authority under the ...

Private Law and the Value of Choice

Some say that private law ought to correct wrongs or to protect rights. Others say that private law ought to maximise social welfare or to minimise social cost. In this book, Emmanuel Voyiakis claims that private law ought to make our responsibilities to others depend on the opportunities we have to affect how things will go for us. Drawing on the work of HLA Hart and TM Scanlon, he argues that private law principles that require us to bear certain practical burdens in our relations with others are justified as long as those principles provide us with certain opportunities to choose what will happen to us, and having those opportunities is something we have reason to value. The book contrasts this 'value-of-choice' account with its wrong- and social cost-based rivals, and applies it to familiar problems of contract and tort law, including whether liability should be negligence-based or stricter; whether insurance should matter in the allocation of the burden of repair; how far private law should make allowance for persons of limited capacities; when a contract term counts as 'unconscionable' or 'unfair'; and when tort law should hold a person vicariously liable for another's mistakes.

Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good

Law and Practical Reason The intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of ... Volume 5: The Logic of Autonomy: Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning Jan-R Sieckmann Law and Authority under the ...

Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from 'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a 'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority.

Freedom and Force

Law and Practical Reason The intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of essays ... Logic of Autonomy: Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning Jan-R Sieckmann Volume 6: Law and Authority under the ...

Freedom and Force

This collection of essays takes as its starting point Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, a seminal work on Kant's thinking about law, which also treats many of the contemporary issues of legal and political philosophy. The essays offer readings and elucidations of Ripstein's thought, dispute some of his claims and extend some of his themes within broader philosophical contexts, thus developing the significance of Ripstein's ideas for contemporary legal and political philosophy. All of the essays are contributions to normative philosophy in a broadly Kantian spirit. Prominent themes include rights in the body, the relation between morality and law, the nature of coercion and its role in legal obligation, the role of indeterminacy in law, the nature and justification of political society and the theory of the state. This volume will be of interest to a wide audience, including legal scholars, Kant scholars, and philosophers with an interest in Kant or in legal and political philosophy.

Shared Authority

Law and Practical Reason the intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of ... 5: the Logic of autonomy: Law, Morality and autonomous reasoning Jan-R Sieckmann Volume 6: Law and authority under the ...

Shared Authority

This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

Objectivity in Jurisprudence Legal Interpretation and Practical Reasoning

moral autonomy, and 227–8 reasonable convergence substantive definitive validity 229–32 229–32 normative propositions ... 116 legal reasoning approaches, generally comparison of 271 limitations of 280 autonomous reasoning balancing ...

Objectivity in Jurisprudence  Legal Interpretation and Practical Reasoning

This thought-provoking book explores the multifaceted phenomenon of objectivity and its relations to various aspects of jurisprudence, legal interpretation and practical reasoning. Featuring contributions from an international group of researchers from differing legal contexts, it addresses topics relevant not only from a theoretical point of view but also themes directly connected with legal and judicial practice.

Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law

This central idea—that law must be autonomous from moral reasoning, or, more generally, practical reasonableness—will be called the Autonomy Thesis (or AT). The AT lies at the core of a normatively driven version of legal positivism3 in ...

Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law

International lawyers have often been interested in the link between their discipline and the foundational issues of jurisprudential method, but little that is systematic has been written on this subject. In this book, an attempt is made to fill this gap by focusing on issues of concept-formation in legal science in general with a view to their application to the specific concerns of international law. In responding to these issues, the author argues that public international law seeks to establish and institutionalise a system of authoritative judgment whereby the conditions by which a community of states can co-exist and co-operate are ensured. A state, in turn, must be understood as ultimately deriving legitimacy from the pursuit of the human dignity of the community it governs, as well as the dignity of those human beings and states affected by its actions in international relations. This argument is in line with a long and now resurgent Kantian tradition in legal and political philosophy. The book shows how this approach is reflected in accepted paradigm cases of international law, such as the United Nations Charter. It then explains how this approach can provide insights into the theoretical foundations of these accepted paradigms, including our understanding of the sources of international law, international legal personality and the design of global institutions.

New Essays on the Nature of Legal Reasoning

And thus law is, for Raz, one thing, and legal reasoning and its sources are something else. ... the law is in some way autonomous, in that it does 33 Joseph Raz (1998) 'Postema on Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical ...

New Essays on the Nature of Legal Reasoning

This is the first book to bring together distinguished jurisprudential theorists, as well as up-and-coming scholars, to critically assess the nature of legal reasoning. The volume is divided into 3 parts: The first part, General Jurisprudence and Legal Reasoning, addresses issues at the intersection of general jurisprudence - those pertaining to the nature of law itself - and legal reasoning. The second part, Rules and Reasons, addresses two concepts central to two prominent types of theory of legal reasoning. The essays in the third and final part, Doctrine and Practice, delve into the mechanics of legal practice and doctrine, from a legal reasoning perspective.

The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law

... demands of the [Autonomy Thesis] in that 'law' (autonomous normativity) operates in a limited domain of practical reason ... law's limited domain from the normal reach of practical reasoning, and especially from the balance of moral ...

The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law

Modern international law is widely understood as an autonomous system of binding legal rules. Nevertheless, this claim to autonomy is far from uncontroversial. International lawyers have faced recurrent scepticism as to both the reality and efficacy of the object of their study and practice. For the most part, this scepticism has focussed on international law's peculiar institutional structure, with the absence of centralised organs of legislation, adjudication and enforcement, leaving international legal rules seemingly indeterminate in the conduct of international politics. Perception of this 'institutional problem' has therefore given rise to a certain disciplinary angst or self-defensiveness, fuelling a need to seek out functional analogues or substitutes for the kind of institutional roles deemed intrinsic to a functioning legal system. The author of this book believes that this strategy of accommodation is, however, deeply problematic. It fails to fully grasp the importance of international law's decentralised institutional form in securing some measure of accountability in international relations. It thus misleads through functional analogy and, in doing so, potentially exacerbates legitimacy deficits. There are enough conceptual weaknesses and blindspots in the legal-theoretical models against which international law is so frequently challenged to show that the perceived problem arises more in theory, than in practice.

The Ethics of Governance

According to Kant, pure practical reason functions on the sheer force of the logical principle of consistency. ... Sandel expresses this point simply when he says, [W]hen we will the moral law, we don't choose as you and me, ...

The Ethics of Governance

The Ethics of Governance: Moral Limits of Policy Decisions offers a toolbox drawn from normative ethics which finds applications in public governance, primarily focusing on policy making and executive action. It includes ethical concepts and principles culled from different philosophical traditions, ranging from more familiar Western theories to non-Western ethical perspectives, thereby providing a truly global, decolonized and expanded normative lens on issues of governance. The book takes a unique and original approach; it demonstrates the use of the ethical toolbox in the context of actual examples of governance challenges. Taking three major case studies each representing an aspect of human-human and/or human-nature and/or human-animal relationship, the book attempts to show the significance of public practical reasoning in policy decisions with the aim of arriving at reasonable responses. Acknowledging the challenges that policy makers often face, the book highlights the fact that policy making is hardly an exercise yielding a black-or-white solution; rather it involves finding the most reasonable normative outcome (course of action) in a given situation, especially employing an expanded understanding of values including well-being, sustainability, interdependence and community. This effort that helps bridge the gap between ethical theorists and policy practitioners exemplifies the necessary role of engaged philosophy in public governance. In the major case studies, Boxes offer facts and figures along with pertinent ethical questions that have been raised and discussed. Aiming to aid the engagement of a diverse audience including non-philosophy readers, each chapter also includes Boxes containing examples, shorter case studies, at-a-glance charts, and tables with comprehensive ethical tools for a quick recap.

Immanuel Kant s Moral Theory

But why should the presupposition of moral reasoning have any greater cogency than the identical presupposition of theoretical ... A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same " ( Gr . 98/447 ; see also 104-5 / 450 ) .

Immanuel Kant s Moral Theory

This book, sure to become a standard reference work, is a comprehensive, lucid, and systematic commentary on Kant's practical (or moral) philosophy. Kant is arguably the most important moral philosopher of the modern period; yet, prior to this area in a single volume. Using as nontechnical a language as possible, Professor Sullivan offers a detailed, authoritative account of Kant's moral philosophy - including his ethical theory, his philosophy of history, his political philosophy, his philosophy of religion, and his philosophy of education - and demonstrates the historical, Kantian origins of such important notions as â€~autonomy', â€~respect for persons', â€~rights', and â€~duties'. An invaluable resource, this book will be extremely useful to advanced undergraduates, graduates, and professional philosophers alike.

Constructing Authorities

See also form of law; maxims; universal scope action-guiding, 48, 78 autonomous. See autonomy heteronomous. ... Hypothetical Imperatives of logic, 14, 34, 37 of reason, 14, 19, 21, 22, 28 of sufficient reason, 17, 28, 37 practical, 18, ...

Constructing Authorities

This collection of essays brings together the central lines of thought in Onora O'Neill's work on Kant's philosophy, developed over many years. Challenging the claim that Kant's attempt to provide a critique of reason fails because it collapses into a dogmatic argument from authority, O'Neill shows why Kant held that we must construct, rather than assume, the authority of reason, and how this can be done by ensuring that anything we offer as reasons can be followed by others, including others with whom we disagree. She argues that this constructivist view of reasoning is the clue to Kant's claims about knowledge, ethics and politics, as well as to his distinctive accounts of autonomy, the social contract, cosmopolitan justice and scriptural interpretation. Her essays are a distinctive and illuminating commentary on Kant's fundamental philosophical strategy and its implications, and will be a vital resource for scholars of Kant, ethics and philosophy of law.

Idealist Ethics

on this way of thinking moral law is understood to have an absolutely binding character, free from any taint of ... of the law of autonomy precludes us from treating any rational being in a way to which their own reason would not give ...

Idealist Ethics

W. J. Mander examines the nature of idealist ethics, that is to say, the form and content of ethical belief most typically adopted by philosophical idealists. While there exist many studies of the ethical views of individual idealist philosophers there has been no literature at all on the notion of idealist ethics per se. Never is it asked: at which points, if any, do the ethical systems of all these thinkers overlap, and what relation, if any, do such commonalities bear to their authors' idealism? Never is the question posed: were you suddenly to become convinced of the truth of some form of philosophical idealism what revisions, if any, would that necessitate in your conception of the truth, nature, and significance of ethical judgements? The inquiry has two aims. The first is historical. From the record of past philosophy, Mander demonstrates that there exists a discernible idealist approach to moral philosophy; a tradition of 'idealist ethics.' He examines its characteristic marks and varieties. The second aim is apologetic. Mander argues that such idealist ethics offers an attractive way of looking at moral questions and that it has much to contribute to contemporary discussion. In particular he argues that Idealist ethics have the power to cut through the sterile opposition between moral realism and moral anti-realism which has come to dominate contemporary thinking about ethical questions. To be an idealist is precisely to hold that the universe is so constituted that things are real if and only if they are ideal; to hold that uncovering in something the work of mind makes it more not less significant.

Rights for Robots

an entirely separate category—“non-personal subjects of law” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 59). ... Observing the logic employed by common law judges in modern American cases, he surmises that autonomy, the factor underlying dignity, ...

Rights for Robots

Bringing a unique perspective to the burgeoning ethical and legal issues surrounding the presence of artificial intelligence in our daily lives, the book uses theory and practice on animal rights and the rights of nature to assess the status of robots. Through extensive philosophical and legal analyses, the book explores how rights can be applied to nonhuman entities. This task is completed by developing a framework useful for determining the kinds of personhood for which a nonhuman entity might be eligible, and a critical environmental ethic that extends moral and legal consideration to nonhumans. The framework and ethic are then applied to two hypothetical situations involving real-world technology—animal-like robot companions and humanoid sex robots. Additionally, the book approaches the subject from multiple perspectives, providing a comparative study of legal cases on animal rights and the rights of nature from around the world and insights from structured interviews with leading experts in the field of robotics. Ending with a call to rethink the concept of rights in the Anthropocene, suggestions for further research are made. An essential read for scholars and students interested in robot, animal and environmental law, as well as those interested in technology more generally, the book is a ground-breaking study of an increasingly relevant topic, as robots become ubiquitous in modern society.

Rescuing Autonomy from Kant

Formula of the Law of Nature (fln) 121, 123–25,128–29, 132–33, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143–44, 146,158–62, 169, ... 224, 232, 235, 237–39 Critique of Pure Reason 85, 93 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 60–61, 63, 79–80, 121–29, ...

Rescuing Autonomy from Kant

In Rescuing Autonomy from Kant, James Furner argues that Marxism’s relation to Kant’s ethics is not one of irrelevance, complementarity or incompatibility, but critique: the value of autonomy can be grounded by appeal to an antinomy in capitalism’s basic structure.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

... Jr. Eugene Rabinpwitch Edward Shils John Simpson Legal Counsel: Walter J. Blum BOARD OF SPONSORS: J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman Harold C. Urey, Vice-Chairman H. A. Bethe Detlev W. Bronk A. H. Compton E. U. Condon F. Daniels L. A. ...

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is the premier public resource on scientific and technological developments that impact global security. Founded by Manhattan Project Scientists, the Bulletin's iconic "Doomsday Clock" stimulates solutions for a safer world.

The Yale Law Journal

There is no one , objective reason . Since Weber's work explores the meanings and origins of qualitatively different forms of rationality , it can be called a sociology of rationalisms . " 8 a B. Four Types of Legal Reasoning The ...

The Yale Law Journal


Almanac of the Federal Judiciary

Until then the autonomy of legal thought was the relatively secure , though periodically contested , premise of ... an era in which law — the attack of the legal realists having been blunted - was confidently regarded as an autonomous ...

Almanac of the Federal Judiciary


Talking Philosophy

Baalman , John ( 1979 ) Outline of Law in Australia ( 4th edn by Geoffrey A. Flick ) , Sydney : Law Book Co. Baker , A. James ( 1979 ) Anderson's Social ... Beardsmore , R. W. ( 1969 ) Moral Reasoning , London : Routledge & Kegan Paul .

Talking Philosophy

"The result of twenty-five years of teaching philosophy, Talking Philosophy presents an informative and critical look at the basic terminology of twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy."--Cover.